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Abstract: 
Objects have always played a fundamental role in our lives, as they passively keep us company and 
tacitly impart their innate quietude. However, what happens when objects become such a power-
ful presence that, as a result, they dominate characters’ lives? Put differently, what happens when 
objects overwhelm people with their potent (that is literally, always there) presence? 
Into the silence of the objects is a place where we become aware of our nothingness, identity crisis, 
language anxiety, and stasis. In Samuel Beckett’s plays Endgame (1958)and Act without Words I 
(1956), the playwright gradually captures the uselessness of the main characters’ lives and the 
transformation of their minds and bodies into a collection of archived objects. Without interacting 
with other people and by self-incarcerating themselves, these Beckettian characters forget what is 
to be human and become “not-a-thing, nothing.” There may be a disturbing fact in this realization, 
and, arguably, even an unfortunate alliteration; nonetheless, what is even more shocking is that 
these characters are paradigmatic for what it means to have stepped into premature ontological 
and existential annihilation. They are now abandoned objects among other objects, an ineffectual 
collection of sorts. 
Based on these arguments, this essay shows Beckett’s tremendous influence toward the develop-
ment of the theory of de-carnalizing and/or de-materializing of the people’s body and mind, culmi-
nating to the technological revolution when we want to be stacked up within uncountable computer 
files. The main argument proposes a reflection on how much we endanger our emotional and social 
sophistication by playing this digital, tricky “game.” 
Keywords: silence, anxiety, self-annihilation, identity, destruction
Resumo: 
Os objetos têm sempre desempenhado um papel fundamental nas nossas vidas, pela forma como 
eles, passivamente, fazem-nos companhia e transmitem tacitamente a sua quietude inata. Contudo, 
o que acontece quando os objetos se tornam uma presença tão poderosa que, como resultado, domi-
nam a vida das pessoas? Noutras palavras, o que é que acontece quando os objetos sobrecarregam 
as pessoas com as suas potentes (falando literalmente, sempre lá) presenças?
No silêncio dos objetos há um lugar onde nos tornamos conscientes da nossa insignificância, da 
nossa crise de identidade, ansiedade de linguagem e entorpecimento. Mas nas peças Endgame e 
Act without Words I  de Samuel Beckett, o dramaturgo gradualmente capta a inutilidade da vida das 
personagens principais e a transformação das suas mentes e corpos numa coleção de objetos ar-
quivados. Sem interagir com outras pessoas e por se autoencarcerarem estas personagens de Beck-
ett esquecem-se o que é ser humano e tornam-se «uma não-coisa, nada». Pode haver um facto 
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perturbador nesta realização, e, sem dúvida, até mesmo uma infeliz aliteração; mesmo assim, o que 
é ainda mais chocante é que estas personagens são paradigmáticas em relação ao que significa ter 
pisado uma aniquilação prematura ontológica e existencial. Estas são agora objetos abandonados 
entre outros objetos, uma espécie de coleção ineficaz.
Com base nestes argumentos, este ensaio mostra uma tremenda influência de Beckett no desen-
volvimento da teoria da descarnalizaçao e da desmaterialização do corpo e mente do povo, cul-
minando na revolução tecnológica onde queremos ser empilhados dentro de incontáveis arquivos 
de computador. O principal argumento propõe uma reflexão sobre como podemos pôr em perigo a 
nossa sofisticação emocional e social, jogando este complicado «jogo» digital.
Palavras-chave: silêncio, ansiedade, aniquilação própria, destruição de identidade.
With love, to John, my husband, whose silence 
is to this day unbeatable. With gratitude, to my 
parents, whose silence is eternal. 
Why this farce, day after day? (Endgame 15) 
The rest is silence. (Hamlet 5.2.688)
I. Introduction
If silence is a disguise of nothingness, then we may claim that to be silent is part of 
the process of becoming whole. In his book, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (1987), 
David Bohm believes the word health “[i]s based on an Anglo-Saxon word ‘hale’ meaning 
‘whole,’ that is, to be healthy. Likewise, the English ‘holy’ is based on the same root as 
‘hole’” (3). Paradoxically, we experience wholeness through fragmentation. Every now 
and then, we would like to be as simple and tacit as nature and natural phenomena are. 
Just as the trees quietly stretch into the ramification of branches, just as the winds coil into 
a speechless dance with nature, sometimes we would like to trade our cacophonic, noisy 
lives for some peaceful episodes. Or, as Max Picard contends, “[s]ilence reveals itself in 
a thousand inexpressible forms: in the quiet of the dawn, in the stealthy descent of night, 
in the silent changing of the seasons, but above all in the silence of the inward soul” (26). 
A reflection of silence, anxiety, word, becoming, and nothingness permeates this 
essay that analyzes two dramatic works of Samuel Beckett, Endgame and Act without 
Words I. In the realm of drama, silences are not a product of the modern period. Leslie 
Kane points to Aeschylus’ Cassandra whose “[w]all of silence contains and is ultimately 
shattered by her unspeakable apocalyptic vision” (24). Another important development 
into incorporating silence in the dramatic spectacle was William Shakespeare’s “[i]nno-
vative and extensive use of soliloquy” (Kane 24). The modern silence, however, is em-
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ployed with a bit of a twist because it alludes to “evanescence and entrapment” (Kane 
24). Beckett’s quasi-silent characters are more symbols than reflections of human beings. 
Confined in one room, like in a prison cell, the characters in Endgame stage the terror of 
being abusively kept captive.  In Act without Words I, the author exposes his version of 
an almost perfect quietude. 
II. Trapped in the Mind
In mid-19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche declared God dead. This assertion  coincided 
with the advent of the modern man. Later, in 1961, Martin Esslin coined the concept 
“Theater of the Absurd”. A modern man still believes, but his ideology resounds more 
“[t]he medieval credo quia absurdum” (Balota 24). In other words, “I believe because 
it is absurd.” Absurdity is defined primarily by a lack of certainties. We have embraced 
the concept of the absurd precisely because our minds cannot operate any longer from a 
Cartesian perspective of cogito, ergo sum, which used to provide existence with highly 
formulaic, ineffectual answers. As long as God was “alive,” human beings had the reas-
surance in a coherent universe, as well as in the benediction of an afterlife. 
By contrast, with God “dead,” man has to provide for himself a new set of beliefs. 
Life is not a vacuum; yet it cannot have fixed meanings. In other words, life is changing 
constantly, and by so doing our beliefs are also changing. While constituting a paradox, 
a modern human being realizes that his only constancy is to experience his existence 
in a permanent change. As a consequence, he cannot help have a feeling of being “[s]-
urrounded by areas of impenetrable darkness, that he can never know his true nature and 
purpose, and that no one will provide him with ready-made rules of conduct” (Esslin 
374). 
Because life is finally understood as an open and unpredictable system, a modern 
man appreciates more his existence hic et nunc, that is, “here and now.” We are tempo-
ral beings, and our main comfort is found in the moment. And in the moment there are 
boredom, anxiety, despair, and absurdity. However, there is also laughter. Aristotle in 
the Poetics spoke about catharsis as a short moment of intersecting our feelings with the 
elaborately fabricated emotions of characters on stage. This way, we would purge our 
fear and would gain a more profound perspective on life. In modern theater, however, 
where gods are “dead,” we have a “dianoetic laughter,” which “[p]oints back to the idea 
of the tragic, but also forward to a world that has become more arbitrary and absurd than 
that of Aeschylus, Sophocles: a world from which the gods have retreated even further” 
(Esslin 16). If we are laughing instead of crying, this does not imply we are insensitive 
beings. It rather indicates our realization of a missing, unifying, and definite principle for 
our life. This may explain why we still push our “rock,” thus echoing the endeavors of 
the legendary Sisyphus. 
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Albert Camus, one of the forefathers of Existentialism, each related to the concept of 
Theater of the Absurd, writes in The Myth of Sisyphus (1955): “This universe without a 
master seems to Sisyphus neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral 
flake of that night--filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward 
the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy ” (91). 
Beckett’s dramatic characters are Sisyphus-like. They know life is nothing but mastering 
a habit. Or, as the author remarks in his essay, “Proust” (1931), “[b]reathing is habit. Life 
is habit. Or rather life is a succession of habits, since the individual is a succession of 
 individuals. The creation of the world did not take place once and for all time, but takes 
place every day” (8). Even if we develop several habits over the years, it is unhealthy 
for us to transform ourselves into a cliché because there is always something new and 
 puzzling that provokes our intellect. 
Endgame’s set is a symbolic skull. Its main character’s name is Hamm who, like 
the human mind, likes to multiply himself in a variety of thoughts. As he acknowledges, 
“Babble, babble, words like the solitary child who turns himself into children, two, three, 
so as to be together, and whisper together, in the dark” (70). The stage of this play is a 
room with a “[b]are interior and gray light” (1). Being caught in a room and cut off from 
the outside (reality), Hamm is just “[v]ox clamans in deserto, the voice speaking in the 
dessert” (Balota 402). While his voice represents the human mind, Clov, the second char-
acter, is an emblem for the human body. Hamm feels he has always been absent because 
he is, indeed, the mind which projects thoughts and fantasies, and concocts ideas. When 
it comes to materializing these ideas, he thinks he has been left offstage, inexplicably cut 
off from his own body. 
HAMM. Absent, always. It all happened without me. I do not know what is happened 
(74). 
To get a meaning for his life, he relies on his buddy/body, Clov, as well as on Nell and 
Nagg, who are just his previous thoughts, now morphed into memories. 
The play starts with Clov uttering the terrifying words, “[f]inished, it is finished, 
nearly finished. Gray upon grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there is a heap, a 
little heap, the impossible heap” (1). To have arrived at the “impossible heap” is to have 
reached the end of life seen as a game, just as the title of this play suggests. When the 
curtains are pulled back, we notice two characters in search of their meaning. To that end, 
they rely on the fickle variations of their memories. As Beckett asserts, “[h]abit is the 
ballast that chains the dog to his vomit. The individual is the seat of a constant process 
of decantation. The pendulum [of a man] oscillates between two poles: suffering and 
boredom” (Proust 9). 
HAMM. Is it night already?
CLOV. No.
HAMM. Then what is it?
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CLOV. Gray. (31)
Moreover, when Hamm asks Clov, “What time is it?,” Clov replies dispassionately: 
“Zero.” On an empty stage, right in its middle, Hamm, the blind old man, is seated in a 
wheelchair. Time seems to have stopped or reached its “zero” hour. This is the ideal mo-
ment when, after a long life, Hamm cannot postpone to dig out his meaning. 
Moreover, “[t]he present time is the instant of zero duration” (Calinescu 256). The 
passing of time is put in parentheses because what counts is only what one feels:
HAMM. What is happening?
CLOV. Something is taking its course (pause).
HAMM. We are not beginning to … to… mean something? (32). 
Despite the grayness, the motionless, the stasis, and the neutrality, “something is 
[still] taking its course.” It helps to note that something or someone starts its or his jour-
ney for the ultimate meaning towards the very end. On a smaller scale, a sentence acquires 
its message after all of its words have been uttered or written. Thus, to reach semantic 
value is just one completed phase in an otherwise interrupting process of accumulating 
and altering significations. 
However, the fear of not having a(ny) meaning is confirmed by Hamm: “To think 
perhaps it won’t all have been for nothing” (33). We are lost in a universe with God ab-
sent. Or, as Esslin argues, “Where there is no certainty, there can be no definite meanings” 
(63). The interaction between Hamm and Clov is short and truncated. There seems to be 
an unresolved conflict between the mind (Hamm) and the body (Clov), the inside and the 
outside. 
HAMM. Why do you stay with me?
CLOV. Why do you keep me?
HAMM. There is no one else.
CLOV. There is nowhere else. (6)
The conflict between them is generated by the fact that both the mind and the body 
are steeped in uncertainty, resulting in their boredom, suffering, and anxiety. Both Hamm 
and Clov crave for a meaning, that is, for an end. Clov goes to the kitchen to stare at the 
wall and catch a glimpse at his “light dying” (12). This passage reminds of Plato’s “Myth 
of the Cave” where people resided in a cave where they were fooled by images projected 
onto a wall through a keyhole. By contrast, Beckett’s characters have consciously turned 
into a closed system, where there is no natural, direct light, and, thus, they are condemned 
to project their lives backwards, in retrospect. For Ihab Hassan, “In Beckett’s world, 
epistemologically all things are ambiguous; and ontologically nothing is whole. Objects 
and persons are predetermined to be partial, and events are near events. Nothing is con-
summated; hence, time is viciously circular” (132). 
These characters are also caught in a circle. While Hamm (the mind) and Clov (the 
body) move forward feeling “something is taking its course,” Nell and Nagg move back-
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ward, into the realm of memories. With two simultaneous movements, time is indeed 
“zero,” at a perfect equilibrium. One movement, which is projected toward completion 
(into the future), annihilates the other, which comes from the already lived folds of being. 
As a consequence, time stands still. 
HAMM. One day you [Clov] will come to a standstill, simply stop and stand still, the 
way you  are now (36). 
Beckett’s characters “[m]ove in opposite directions simultaneously, as if walking on 
the length of a Möbius strip searching for the other side of a one-sided surface” (Roach 
309). This is the reason why Nell and Nagg are portrayed as white and are kept in a bin. 
They stand for Hamm’s memories and allude to his cyclical, quite predictable existence. 
Yet nothing has ended; everything continues its monotonous flow:
NELL. Nothing is funnier than unhappiness. It is the most comical thing in the world. 
We laugh, laugh, we laugh with a will, in the beginning. But it is always the same thing. 
Yes, it is the funny story we have heard too often, we still find it funny, but we do not 
laugh any more. (18) 
Life is a continuum where past moments return obsessively. Even if Hamm says, 
“Silence. Have you [Nell] not finished? Will you never finish?” (23), memories can never 
end because they drag us constantly to the realm of yesterday. Their sole purpose is an 
anchorage into what happened (and cannot be changed). Barely discernable, Nell and 
Nagg recollect fragments of stories: of Ardennes, when they lost their “shanks,” of Lake 
Come, one day after they got engaged (16).
Endgame is a modern play because it does not have a traditional plot. Therefore, 
the presence of Nell and Nagg suggests something about the main character, Hamm. He 
does not say much, but his memories cannot be silenced. He is in a wheelchair, and, to 
relieve his physical pain, he needs a painkiller; but he cannot stop Nell and Nagg from 
 remembering. In other words, Hamm does not possess a method to alleviate the trauma 
of his past. This is why he says, “Something [is] dripping in my head, ever since the 
 fontannelles. Splash, splash, always on the same spot (pause). Perhaps is like a vein” (50). 
The vein is nothing else but Hamm’s mind fragmenting itself in countless tiny exi(s)ts, 
pulsating back and forth the blood of his being. 
About Martin Heidegger’s theory of time, Piotr Hoffman asserts:
The ecstatic future is no ‘later’ than the ecstatic present, for at any moment 
of my life I am equally vulnerable to the power of death, and hence that 
 vulnerability of mine is always an actual, live issue for me. My past, too, is not 
something that has simply elapsed and is now left behind, something existing 
‘no longer now, but earlier.’ This is so because my past is nothing other than 
my ‘thrownness’— that is my rootedness in a culture, my already established 
preferences, skills, and habits. (208)
Therefore, with time ticking its “zero” hour, as Endgame leads to believe, Hamm 
lives an ecstasy, a standing out of being. Moreover, it seems Hamm is at a moment in 
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his life where words have been spoken for too long. He says, “[a]h, the creatures, the 
 creatures, everything has to be explained to them” (43). Hamm, the mind, is tired of offer-
ing explanations. He wants to rest for a while and starts using fewer words. He is verbally 
exhausted. Therefore, “[t]he pause is desired because it reverses the act of speaking, it is 
a return to a condition of interiority” (Brinzeu 232). In Hamm’s case, on the other hand, 
a return to a condition of interiority is not exactly bliss because he is blind and paralyzed.
HAMM. Quiet, quiet. You [Nell and Nagg] are keeping me awake (pause). If I could 
sleep I might make love. I’d go into the woods. My eyes would see… the sky, the earth. 
I’d run, run, they [his memories] would not catch me (18).  
An alternative to quieting his memories is imagining, projecting, and thus  dreamingly 
going out of his being. But when Hamm is kept inside of a room, when his eyes cannot 
see, and when his limbs cannot move, his imagination is limited to travel to few places. 
When existence is experienced isolated, our imagination and conscience are denied access 
into multiplicity and/or otherness. According to Jean-Paul Sartre, “[a]ll consciousness is 
consciousness of something. Consciousness enfolds its objects in a shell of nothingness, 
thus making itself a reflecting of them, a point of view of them” (261). Put differently, 
consciousness in itself is empty since it is relational. Having suffered too much too long, 
Hamm hopes Clov (the body) will come to rescue him (his mind).
HAMM. Why do not you [Clov] finish us? (37)
Hamm begs his body to die, so that the mind, with all its memories and fantasies, will 
also end (“finish us,” emphasis mine). The last lines of the play are a mediation between 
life and death, beginning and end. 
CLOV. One day, suddenly, it [the mind] ends. It [the mind] changes. I do not un-
derstand, it [the mind] dies, or it is me [the body], I do not understand that either. I ask 
the words that remain—sleeping, waking, morning, evening. They have nothing to say 
(pause). I open the door of the cell and go. I am so bowed I only see my feet, if I open my 
eyes, and between my legs a little trail of black dust. (81)
It appears that we are situated on two axes: of activity (“sleeping” and “waking,” two 
verbal adjectives) and of rest, respectively (“morning” and “evening,” two nouns). 
It is Hamm, however, who has one last puzzling and intriguing remark: “Moments for 
nothing, now as always, time was never and time is never” (83). Are we so insignificant 
that our existence seems to lack a temporal framework? And once we die, are we also 
washed away, forgotten? According to Heraclitus, the ancient Greek philosopher, “[m]
an lights a light for himself in the night, because he is dead and yet still alive. In sleep he 
touches himself as dead when the light of his eyes has faded, but in waking he touches 
himself not dead but only asleep” (qtd. in Picard 156). Existence is as fragile as a dream 
whose meaning is teasingly deferred. 
HAMM. Since that’s the way we are playing it [the life] … (he unfolds handker-
chief)…let’s play it that way…(he unfolds)…and speak no more about it…(he finishes 
unfolding)…speak no more. (he holds handkerchief spread out before him). Old stancher! 
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(pause)  You…remain (pause; he covers his face with handkerchief, lowers his arms to 
armrests, remains motionless), (84). Beckett prefers to conclude this play ambiguously. 
Hamm (the mind) finally returns to its invisible origins where the “old stancher” may be 
his only silent posthumous validation. 
Within the Theater of the Absurd a situation is staged presenting one possibility 
among many because “[i]t is trying to present a sense of being, it can neither investigate 
nor solve problems of conduct or morals. The spectator’s suspense consists in waiting for 
the gradual completion of this pattern which will enable him to see the image as a whole” 
(Esslin 366). But when the image of the play as a whole has finally been presented, we 
should silence our reactions to let our feelings and perceptions find their meanings. To 
achieve that, Beckett advises us to look at the objects around us because their balanced 
silence may teach us how to restore ours. 
III. Among All Objects, Here I Am
Act without Words I is a return into the antechamber of language, where gestures, 
and not words, implicitly convey the message of the play. Beckett’s character is a pan-
tomime performer, who has routinely transformed himself into an object. With him, we 
metaphorically go back inside the flesh of being, where we are as close to taciturnity and 
self-destruction as possible. According to Brendan Gill, “At the heart of pantomime is 
the sublimated anguish of lost speech; even as we are being entertained, we measure that 
loss and feel for the mute performer the sympathy aroused by any profound inescapable 
defect. To be in the presence of an imposed, unnatural silence is in effect to be rendered 
deaf” (qtd. in Leabhart 2) 
In a pantomime, however, there is something more than an “unnatural silence.” It is 
the performer’s desire to symbolize rather than explicitly state something. After all, “[e]
veryone in the world uses mime, although it is rarely given the name. When words are 
difficult to find, when emotion is great, gestures take over” (Walker 11). If gestures, and 
not words, are the quintessence of a pantomime performance, then what we see, and not 
what we hear, will transport us into the realm of interpretation. 
Traditionally, the pantomime performer suggests objects by means of gestures. On 
the other hand, Beckett’s performer is helped by real objects, which descend from above. 
On an almost bare stage, these items function like cartoon captions. Beckett’s pantomime 
performer does not engage in a descriptive monologue with them because he may feel as 
soundless as them. Once they descend from above, they stay on stage a couple of minutes, 
enough to tease, and not release, the pantomime performer from his painful act of finding 
his role in this world. 
In All about Mime: Understanding and Performing the Expressive Silence (1982), 
Maravene Sheppard Loeschke argues that “The pantomime uses sense memory in the 
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handling of all the imaginary objects that appear in his story. That is, the mime perfor-
mer must remember what the real object looked like, felt like, smelled like, sounded, or 
tasted like, and must recreate it as if it were real” (7). By contrast, Beckett’s performer, 
having been helped by genuine objects, should have spoken with them. His silence is 
perchance a way of reflecting on the old phrase according to which “words fail us.” Leon-
ard Shlain believes the verbs “to fail” and “to fall” have a common descendant from the 
Latin verb fallare, “to fail, to deceive” (308). Metaphorically speaking, we are afraid of 
falling: “Homo sapiens is first and foremost a primate. Although none of us flies among 
the treetops anymore, we still retain buried deep within our archaic collective memory an 
atavistic fear of falling” (Shlain 308). 
When Act without Words I opens, we are induced a vague feeling of descending:
Dessert. Dazzling light. 
The man is flung backwards on stage from right wing. He falls, gets up immediately, 
dusts himself, turns aside, reflects.
Whistle from right wing. 
He reflects, goes out right.
Immediately flung back on stage he falls, gets up immediately, dusts himself, turns 
aside, reflects.
Whistle from left wing.
He reflects, goes out left. (125)
The man is flung back and forth, right and left by an unknown force. When he is on 
the ground, he “dusts” himself. He hears whistles and, one day, he will discover the last 
piece of his life’s puzzle that will turn him almost alchemically into non-being. 
Therefore, he is a fallen as well as a failed creature. Whatever he reflects upon, 
throughout the entire performance, is not going to be explicitly stated. Chronologically, 
the objects that appear from above are a tree, scissors, a carafe of water, three cubes, and 
a rope. The tree’s “tuft of palms” helps him reflect upon his own hands (126). With the 
scissors he “trims his nails” (126). With the rope he tries unsuccessfully to commit suici-
de, prior having tested the stability of the three cubes. 
The most puzzling and teasing of all these objects is the carafe of water. No matter 
how hard he tries to reach it, the carafe is pulled back from above. Because of this futile 
endeavor, Beckett’s character reminds us of the mythological figure of Tantalus who was 
punished to crave for food and drink, and, whenever he needed them, they would retract 
further and further. Hence, we could say Beckett’s performer’s efforts to reach the carafe 
of water are tantalizing. Just to tease him even harder, when almost all other objects (with 
the exception of the tree) have been pulled back and disappeared “in flies” (132), “[t]he 
carafe descends from flies and comes to rest a few feet from his body. He does not move. 
Whistle from above. He does not move. The carafe descends further, dangles and plays 
about his face. He does not move. The carafe is pulled up and disappears in flies” (132). 
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The performance is nearly over. After unsuccessful attempts to reach the jug, Beckett’s 
character has lost both his thirst and, by extension, his desire for accumulating knowledge 
and power. Afterwards, the play approaches an inevitably abrupt moment: “The bough 
returns to horizontal, the palms open, the shadow returns. Whistle from above. He does 
not move. The tree is pulled up and disappears in flies. He looks at his hand” (133). As 
readers or spectators, we are disoriented and abandoned because we have not been offered 
any closure. 
The playwright does not create a traditional pantomime because he emphasizes the 
futility of his performer’s life. When he came into this world, it was already full with 
objects. Beckett’s character does not mime objects for his audience because they have al-
ways preceded us so their history is deeper than ours. Point in fact, he does not even give 
them a personal signifier. He does not speak either because he feels there have already 
been said too many words. Act without Words I ends with the character contemplating his 
hands, without being able to find them a utilitarian usage. The question is whether or not 
we take part in this desperate man’s drama, or if have abandoned him altogether because 
his prolonged silence determined us to leave. 
IV. Conclusion
We are constantly caught in a world of silence and word because “One’s being is 
a tensional synthesis of the determinate and the nondeterminate, in which the latter is 
preeminent. This preeminence is manifested in the preeminence of silence” (Dauenhauer 
162). In other words, the soul which desires, the body which feels, and the mind which 
thinks are tacit components of our be(com)ing. 
We are afraid of the ultimate silence because we are afraid of annihilation. We feel 
we have been left in this world without any certainty, except that of our imminent death. 
According to Anton Ehrenzweig, “There was another tree in the paradise garden apart 
from the tree of knowledge; it was the tree of life. Had the first pair eaten from the tree 
of life they would have become immortal” (235). To reassure ourselves of our own short 
existence, we rush into speaking, without always verifying our ideas, thoughts, or even 
feelings. There is a certain death that approaches us from behind when we speak care-
lessly. We do not want to hear our last word vanishing in the air because that last uttered 
word will, again and again, reveal the limit of our “esse-nce.”
Then, what are the words that we use? Clov (the body) tells Hamm (the mind): “I use 
the words you thought me. If they do not mean anything anymore, teach me others. Or let 
me be silent” (44). The mind is the one which dictates what to feel to the body. Once we 
have learned how to speak, we are unstoppable. By so doing, our bodies and minds are 
trapped in the word. As a result, “Words that merely come from other words [i.e., without 
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silence] are hard and aggressive. Such words are also lonely. Language is surrounded by 
the dark rim of melancholy, no longer by the rim of silence” (Picard 37). 
To conclude, we arrange and structure our lives primarily by means of reasoning, 
when in fact our intellect pushes us away from ourselves. Just like the tree silently com-
municates with the earth, so should we, if we roll back into the vibrant rooms of feelings. 
This way, we dig deeper and deeper into our sentient layers of being. Our bodies are the 
ultimate objects that the mind chisel and alter time and time again. As implied by Beckett, 
the trick or challenge is to learn when to stop distancing ourselves from life’s short mo-
ments of excitement just to ensure that we do not become silent objects, that is, complete 
aliens whose time is unchangeably frozen or “zero.”
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